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REGULATING SECRECY
W. Nicholson Price II *
Abstract: Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual property systems of
protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy. But accounts of this choice
underexplore the role of the regulators that dominate some areas of innovation. Regulation
interacts with intellectual property exclusivity in socially problematic ways by encouraging
secrecy at the expense of innovation, efficiency, and competition. This Article theorizes how
regulation empowers intellectual property generally, explains why this strengthening is
problematic for trade secrecy but not for patents, and offers the solution of regulator-enforced
disclosure.
When a regulator defines a product or a process, it becomes much harder to successfully
commercialize minor variations on that product or process. Any associated intellectual
property exclusivity thus gets much more powerful. When the FDA approves a new drug,
patents covering that chemical become much costlier to invent around because similar but
non-identical chemicals lack the tremendous benefit of FDA approval. This interaction
between patents and regulation interaction, however, can be noted and explicitly addressed
by policy. The Hatch-Waxman Act, for example, facilitates generic drug entry once drug
patents expire. Regulation strengthens trade secrecy too, but more problematically. Biologics,
which comprise the most innovative and expensive drugs today, are the path-dependent result
of complex, secret manufacturing processes. Meeting the FDA’s definition of a biologic
requires reverse-engineering its complex, secret process, making trade secrecy much more
valuable, but stifling competition and innovation. In such situations, regulation can push
firms to choose secrecy over patents in precisely those socially important industries, like
drugs, medical devices, and pesticides, where disclosure is most important.
Where regulation creates problems, however, it also offers the hope of a solution.
Regulators are in a strong position to require disclosure directly: regulated firms have strong
incentives for candor, regulators have the necessary expertise, and regulatory incentives can
offset the costs of disclosure. More effective regulator-mediated disclosure would increase
oversight and enable cumulative innovation, while retaining incentives for invention in
regulated industries.
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INTRODUCTION
Five years after Congress enacted a scheme to promote competition
for biologic drugs, very few competitors have entered the market.1
Biologics are wildly expensive and look to stay that way. Why is there
so little competition?

1. In 2010, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, Sections
7001–03, 124 Stat. 804, was passed as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The
FDA approved only its fourth biosimilar application on September 23, 2016. Ezequiel Minaya, FDA
Approves Amgen’s Biosimilar Version of Humira, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/fda-approves-amgens-biosimilar-version-of-humira-1474669560 [https://perma.cc/3F
BX-BY9Y].
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Traditional intellectual property explanations provide no answers. The
patents on the biologics in question are expired or expiring. 2 Trade
secrecy is foreclosed (at least theoretically) by the disclosure necessary
to obtain those patents in the first place. 3 And under the statutory
scheme governing biologics, the pseudo-patent protection of regulatory
exclusivity has also expired for these biologics. 4 Instead, the lack of
competition reflects a potent interaction between tight regulatory control
and intellectual property, one that has gone largely unnoticed in the
scholarly discourse on innovation policy. This Article is the first to
theorize how regulation empowers intellectual property generally, to
explain why this strengthening is problematic for trade secrecy but not
for patents, and to offer the solution of regulator-enforced disclosure.
The modern economy thrives on innovation, and the incentives
available to help drive that innovation are an accordingly significant
focus of academic and policy attention. Scholars debate when patents are
most appropriate, the limits of patentability, and how best to set patent
parameters to create ideal incentives. 5 Similarly, they discuss whether
and when trade secrecy is a fruitful alternative to patents, and the scope
and strength of trade secrecy doctrine.6 These debates about the function
of intellectual property and the available incentives can be substantially
enriched by considering a key dynamic: the role of regulation.
Trade secrecy and patents interact powerfully with regulatory control.
The most important interaction is when a regulator defines a product
based on characteristics that are themselves independently protected by
intellectual property. 7 Regulatory benefits—approval of a drug,
2. Bruno Calo-Fernández & Juan Leonardo Martínez-Hurtado, Biosimilars: Company Strategies
to Capture Value from the Biologics Market, 5 PHARMACEUTICALS 1393, 1394 (2012).
3. See infra section I.B.
4. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 345, 359–66 (2007) (describing FDA-administered periods of regulatory market or
data exclusivity, where competitors are prevented from entering the market or from using the first
firm’s data, as “pseudo-patents,” and characterizing their role in innovation policy).
5. For a sampling of this extensive literature, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63
STAN. L. REV 1315 (2011); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004); Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839
(1990); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV.
503 (2009); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010).
6. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917 (2011); Richard
A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); Michael
Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007).
7. See infra section II.A.
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acceptability of a pesticide, or even just a slightly faster path through
regulatory checks thanks to regulatory familiarity—then strengthen
whatever intellectual property protects that product characteristic.8
Essentially, regulation makes inventing around the intellectual property
boundaries much harder—even if the technical task of inventing around
is unchanged, the economic benefits of doing so are decreased except for
a much narrower subset of that invention. This intellectual property
strengthening happens whether the protection is supplied by patents or
by trade secrecy.
Regulation can push firms to choose trade secrecy over patents by
changing their relative strengths and weaknesses. Trade secrecy has an
indefinite duration, but is narrow in scope; if regulators’ product
definitions make it hard or impossible to invent around that narrowness,
the indefinite duration becomes much more attractive. 9 When regulatory
hurdles promote static practices, a similar effect applies. Accordingly,
highly regulated industries may see problematically high levels of
secrecy. As firms disclose less information, cumulative innovation
becomes harder.
The importance of these dynamics is magnified by the role of heavily
regulated industries. Almost by definition, industries with powerful
regulators carry high social welfare costs and benefits. 10 To provide a
few key examples, the pharmaceutical and medical device industries are
crucial for public health, the nuclear industry matters for both power and
national defense, and pesticides have strong environmental and
agricultural implications. Accordingly, systemic problems of innovation
and competition in these industries may have particularly large social
welfare effects.
The innovation problems resulting from regulatory interaction with
intellectual-property exclusivity are not merely theoretical; they have
major practical consequences in the real world. This Article focuses on
two examples in the biopharmaceutical industry—biologics
manufacturing and small-molecule drug manufacturing—to demonstrate
the depth of potential innovation failures. Biologics face a potent
interaction where regulatory product definitions interact with secret but
essential manufacturing processes to not only retard innovation in
manufacturing itself, but also to prevent competitors from entering the

8. See infra section II.C
9. See infra section II.C.2.
10. See infra section II.B.
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market. 11 Small-molecule drug manufacturing techniques are subject to
regulatory hurdles to innovative change, and, at least partially as a
consequence, rely on the long-term protection of secrecy. 12 This lack of
change has tremendous efficiency costs as well as the human costs of
drug shortages and contamination events. 13
Regulatory oversight, however, creates both problems and the
possibility of a novel solution. Regulators in heavily regulated industries
are uniquely suited to enforcing a disclosure obligation to counteract
regulatory incentives toward secrecy. Because firms seeking regulatory
approval are trying primarily to convince the regulator of the quality of
their process or product, they have incentives to disclose more candidly
and fully than in other situations, such as when seeking a patent. 14
Regulatory disclosure could thus avoid many of the problems that plague
the patent system’s disclosure function. 15 To remove the decreased
incentives arising from reducing trade secrecy, disclosure could be
coupled with regulatory exclusivity. 16
Broad disclosure requirements would have significant implications,
most of them positive. Cumulative innovation would become
significantly easier, and innovations requiring network effects or
widespread licensing—both difficult in a secrecy regime— would
become more attractive. 17 Employee mobility could be enhanced to the
extent that trade secrecy demands non-compete agreements. 18 Disclosure
would enable the possibility of informed citizen oversight, a task
currently left largely to overburdened regulators. 19 Finally, and more
neutrally, a strong disclosure regime may have both positive and
negative effects on the strength of intellectual property protection for
11. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and
Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1044 (2016).
12. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 510–22, 532–38 (2014).
13. Id.
14. See infra section IV.A.
15. See infra section I.D.2.
16. See infra section IV.C. This coupling would in some instances provide an additional
incentive, but in others would remove the possibility for triple-dipping engaged in by some
companies that rely on regulatory exclusivity, patents, and trade secrecy to protect the same patent.
See infra section III.B. For a proposal to limit problematic double-dipping by firms seeking both
patent protection and regulatory exclusivity for biologics, see Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory
Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 419, 464–70 (2012).
17. See infra section IV.B.1.
18. See infra section IV.B.2.
19. See infra section IV.B.3.
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innovation; while trade secrecy becomes unavailable, patents become
easier to enforce because information about infringement is more
transparent. 20 Thus, the overall amount of intellectual property
protection may not actually change much, as firms may pursue
previously unenforceable patents.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the basic doctrines
of patents and trade secrecy and discusses the scholarly debate about the
appropriate balance between the two in different innovation situations.
Part II describes the theoretical interactions of patents and trade secrecy
with regulation in the context of heavily regulated industries, and in
particular the problematic effects of trade secrecy in such industries. Part
III further details the problematic on-the-ground effects of
manufacturing secrecy in the heavily regulated industries of small-drug
and biologics. Part IV suggests regulator-mediated disclosure as a policy
solution. A few brief thoughts conclude.
I.

PATENTS AND TRADE SECRECY

Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual property
systems of protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy. 21
Under the first, inventors receive defined protection of broad scope and
limited duration, but must disclose their inventions to the public. Under
the second, inventors receive protection that is narrow in scope, but
which can last as long as the secret is kept and which of necessity
eschews disclosure. This Part describes the doctrinal basics of patents
and trade secrecy, notes key differences in legal structures and in
implementation costs, and concludes by briefly summarizing the
scholarly debate on the appropriate balance between the two systems.

20. See infra section IV.B.4.
21. This framing is typical, though an increasing literature recognizes that sometimes inventors
can avail themselves of both patents and trade secrecy for different parts of an invention. See, e.g.,
Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012);
Ted Sichelman & Brenda Simon, Data-Generating Patents, 111 N.W.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2753547
[https://perma.cc/QPA6ZLQP]. Intellectual property is not the only way of creating incentives for innovation; a significant
literature focuses on alternative mechanisms. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent
Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV 115 (2003); Heled, supra note 16; Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013); Maxwell R. Morgan,
Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient
Incentive Mechanisms, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93 (2010); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual
Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014). This Article focuses
on the still-dominant mechanisms of intellectual property: patents and trade secrecy.
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Doctrinal Basics

The need for intellectual-property protection arises because
innovation is typically a public good. Innovative information is usually
both non-excludable—that is, it is difficult to prevent others from using
it once known 22—and non-rival, meaning that the use of the information
by some does not make the information unavailable for use by others. 23
This makes it hard for innovators to internalize the full social value of
their innovation. 24 Consequently, from a social welfare standpoint,
innovators will tend to underinvest in innovation. 25 Society would prefer
high investment in innovation; excludability mechanisms that let
inventors capture more of the value of their innovations help increase
that level of invention.
For technological inventions, the two principal mechanisms for
exclusion are patents and trade secrets.26 Under patent law, inventors
may file for a patent on an invention that is new, useful, and nonobvious,
so long as that invention comprises a patentable subject matter. 27 The
inventor must disclose the subject matter of the patent, including a
sufficient written description to demonstrate that she possesses the
invention, as well as to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to
practice the invention. 28 If the inventor fulfills these statutory criteria, a
patent will issue. The patent gives the inventor the right to exclude

22. There is some debate over whether the availability of secrecy means that information that can
be kept secret is not actually a public good. Mark Lemley argues that the information retains its
public-good nature. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1052 n.87 (2005). Jonas Anderson argues that the availability of secrecy removes the
free-riding aspect of information public goods by allowing excludability, so that whether the goods
are technically still public is irrelevant. See Anderson, supra note 6. For the purposes of this Article,
the distinction is without much difference; trade secrecy functions as an alternative to patent law to
allow excludability of information, and whether the underlying goods remain public does not
change that calculus.
23. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 129 (2004).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 129–30, 130 n.2 (noting limits to such ex ante incentive justifications).
26. In the pharmaceutical industry, trademarks also play a substantial role, including interactions
with regulatory regimes. Drug packaging, coloration, and shape can all influence consumer
behavior, and may be regulated as well. Drug names also play a major role, including in prescribing
behavior by physicians. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Biosimilars: What’s in a Name?, 348 BMJ 272
(2014) (describing the naming of follow-on biologics). These issues are outside the scope of this
Article.
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012).
28. Id. § 112.
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others from making, using, selling, or otherwise practicing the invention
for a period of twenty years from the patent application date. 29
Trade secret law provides the principal alternative to patent law.30
Under the doctrine of trade secrecy, an inventor may elect to keep her
invention secret. Trade secret law protects secret information that is
subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy and derives independent
economic value from its secrecy. 31 Those who misappropriate that
information are liable for that misappropriation. 32 Trade secrecy,
notably, does not protect against reverse engineering or independent
invention. 33
B.

Legal Differences

An extensive scholarly literature addresses the differences between
patents and trade secrecy from the point of view of an inventor seeking
to maximize the return on her invention. Drawing with very broad
strokes, there are three key differences between the two schemes: the
requirement of disclosure, the scope of protection, and the duration of
protection.
The first central distinction—indeed, a defining distinction—between
patents and trade secrecy is that obtaining a patent requires disclosing
the subject matter of the invention, while trade secrecy requires the
opposite; the invention must be kept secret to be the subject of trade
secrecy protection. 34 The extent to which these actually differ in practice
is a matter of some debate; Mark Lemley argues that trade secrecy law
actually increases the disclosure of secret inventions, 35 and many argue
that the disclosure role of the patent system functions poorly. 36
However, the difference in disclosure remains significant both formally
and in the courts, even if its practical significance is disputed.
29. Id. §§ 154, 271.
30. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248–49 (1998). Variations in the interpretation of trade secret law by different
states are outside the scope of this Article, but the basic contours of the doctrine are relatively
constant. A subset of trade secrecy misappropriation is covered by the Economic Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1831 (2012). Congress has also recently enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act to create a
federal trade secrecy private right of action. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114153, (May 11, 2016).
31. Bone, supra note 30.
32. Id. at 250–51.
33. Id.
34. Anderson, supra note 6, at 925.
35. Lemley, supra note 6, at 333–37.
36. See infra section I.D.2.
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A second key distinction between trade secrecy and patents is the
scope of the protection available, both what information is protected and
from whom that information is protected. 37 Patents provide the patentee
with the right to exclude all others from making, using, or offering to
sell the invention within the United States; 38 this protection applies
regardless of whether the other party independently invented the
patented subject matter, stole it, reverse-engineered it, or acquired it in
any other way. Trade secrecy, on the other hand, provides only a right
against misappropriation of the information kept secret. If others
reverse-engineer the innovation or invent it independently, trade secret
law gives no rights against those others to the original inventor. 39
Finally, trade secrecy and patents differ substantially in the duration
of protection provided. Patents have a clearly defined term of twenty
years from the date of the application. 40 Although this term can be
lengthened—most notably for administrative delays on the part of the
patent office 41 or, in the case of a drug, by the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) 42—it nonetheless has a distinct end. 43 Trade
secrecy, on the other hand, lasts as long as the information is kept
secret. 44 Once the information is disclosed, trade secret protection
ceases; until that point, it can last indefinitely.
C.

Practical Differences

In addition to the legal differences between the two regimes, both
innovators and policymakers face practical differences in

37. Anderson, supra note 6, at 924–25.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Selling the invention or importing it into the United States also
constitutes patent infringement, as do various other, more specific, actions. See Anderson, supra
note 6, at 924–25.
39. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmts. 1–2 (amended 1985).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
41. Id. § 154(b).
42. Id. § 156.
43. Firms frequently try to extend the effective patent protection on a product by acquiring
ancillary patents that cover the commercial product, methods of use, or other aspects other than the
product itself; this process, known as “evergreening,” is especially prevalent in the pharmaceutical
industry. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012). However, evergreening
can only do so much, and each individual patent remains a right with a defined duration. Id.
44. Anderson, supra note 6, at 924; see also Price, supra note 12, at 534–36 (describing a tradesecret protected monopoly on the drug Premarin that has existed since 1942).
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implementation. 45 The patent system is substantially more expensive for
the government and innovators, both in terms of its administration—that
is, obtaining patents—and the enforcement of patents once granted.
With respect to administration, the patent system generates significant
costs for both firms and the government. 46 Patent applications are formal
legal documents that are costly to draft, partly because they must meet
the stringent statutory requirements of the Patent Act. 47 Once drafted,
patent applications are filed and, after an often lengthy back-and-forth
with examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), patents may be granted. The PTO employs approximately
8,300 patent examiners, charged with evaluating the more than 500,000
patent applications filed each year. 48 Patent applications cost an average
of $10,000 to $30,000 to file, and thousands more to maintain once
granted. 49 Trade secrecy, by contrast, requires no legal formalities to
obtain; the information must simply be kept secret. 50
Firm-level enforcement costs are also substantially higher for patent
law than for trade secrecy. Significant passive enforcement of patents
occurs; firms may avoid practicing an invention in the shadow of patent
litigation, especially since knowledge of a patent increases the likelihood
of treble damages for infringement. 51 In those instances where active
enforcement is needed, however, patentees must identify infringement—

45. Both regimes also come with systemic costs in the form of deadweight loss to consumers
resulting from supracompetitive pricing. This deadweight loss is offset by the social value of the
innovation incentivized. Anderson and Strandburg have noted that the deadweight loss created by
patent monopolies is unnecessary if trade secrecy is available, Anderson, supra note 6, at 939–40
(citing Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 111 (2004)), but to the extent that trade secrecy allows
supracompetitive pricing—that is, to the extent that it creates ex ante incentives for innovation—
that pricing should be expected to create the same deadweight as if the monopoly were patentprotected. Cf. Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product
Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1861–63 (2014) (discussing similar
deadweight loss in the copyright space).
46. Anderson, supra note 6, at 925.
47. Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012).
48. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS
1963–2015 (2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/
MMK9-F5CR] (noting 571,612 utility patents filed in 2013).
49. Anderson, supra note 6, at 925 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498–99 (2000)).
50. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985). Jonas Anderson has argued that trade secret
law would be better served by a registry of trade secrets, which would impose some small
administrative costs; however, no such registry currently exists. Anderson, supra note 6, at 975–77.
51. See Jon E. Wright, Note, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages-Evolution and
Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 107 (2001).
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a substantial challenge for methods patents, which are often difficult to
observe 52—and then bring a costly infringement suit.
Trade secrecy is typically cheaper to enforce for two reasons. First,
although successful secrecy carries implementation costs, 53 it is selfenforcing: competitors cannot capitalize on information denied to them
by secrecy. 54 Second, where misappropriation does occur, trade secret
litigation is often substantially less expensive than patent litigation. 55 On
the other hand, detecting misappropriation under a trade secrecy regime
can also be quite difficult, given the defenses of independent invention
and reverse engineering. 56
D.

Tradeoffs

The tradeoff between trade secrecy and patent law is the subject of
intense debate. On the question of whether patents or trade secrecy better
provides ex ante incentives for innovation, scholars differ, though the
courts have broadly taken the view that patents are preferable. This
section briefly outlines this debate.
1.

General Considerations

Court rulings in intellectual property cases generally suggest an
underlying policy preference for patent law and its accompanying
disclosure over trade secrecy in cases where both are available. The
Supreme Court has described disclosure as the “quid pro quo” for patent
protection; 57 it has also noted that federal patent law does not currently
preempt state trade secrecy law, but could do so if state law were found
to interfere with the policy of patent law.58 Patent law doctrines evince

52. Jeffrey I. D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement
Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 7–9 (2002).
53. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 355 (discussing practical costs of keeping secrets).
54. Competitors can reverse-engineer or independently discover some secrets, but that process
requires investment and is not always successful. See, e.g., Price, supra note 12, at 534–38
(describing failed attempts to independently invent or reverse-engineer drug manufacturing
processes).
55. Anderson, supra note 6, at 953 n.197 (comparing costs of trade secret and patent litigation).
56. Price, supra note 12, at 536–38 (noting the difficulty of detecting misappropriation of secret
biologic manufacturing methods).
57. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
58. Id. at 489–90 (“If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that
holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state
protection, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to
exist.”).
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this policy preference for patents over trade secrets. Inventors must
patent an invention within a year of putting it “in public use [or] on
sale.” 59 In addition, the lack of broad prior user rights means that a first
inventor who practices a patent as a trade secret may be enjoined from
practicing her invention by a second inventor who patents that
invention. 60 The preference for patents over secrecy has been slightly
diminished by 2011’s America Invents Act, but doctrines still push firms
toward patents. 61
Scholars debate whether this preference for patents is good or bad,
generally framing the question as the desirability of trade secrets against
the well-understood backdrop of patent-law incentives. 62 In a pair of
prominent articles, Robert Bone has argued that trade secrecy is a
doctrine without justification and that its purposes are better served by
59. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)–(b) (2012). Under § 102(a), an invention is unpatentable if in public use
or on sale prior to the filing date of the patent; however, § 102(b) creates an exception for
disclosures by the inventor within the year prior to filing. Before 2011’s enactment of the America
Invents Act, a preference for patenting was also demonstrated in the context of interference
proceedings to determine patent priority among contemporaneous patent applications, where an
inventor who had “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed” his invention lost priority to one who had
not. Anderson, supra note 6, at 933–34. The America Invents Act arguably changed whether an
inventor’s own secret prior use will prevent patentability under § 102, though this issue has yet to be
definitively resolved. See, e.g., Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,084 (Feb. 14, 2013) (“102(a)
was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private offers for sale or
private uses or secret processes practiced in the United States that result in a product or service that
is then made public may be deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be the case.”)
(quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011)). But see Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the
Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (2015) (arguing the definition of “public use”
is and should be unchanged); Dmitry Karshtedt, The Riddle of Secret Public Use: A Response to
Professor Lemley, 93 TEX. L. REV. 159 (2015) (agreeing with Lemley on statutory grounds but
rejecting secret prior use based on precedent and policy); Edward D. Manzo, The Impact of the
America Invents Act on Trade Secrets, 13 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 497, 502–17
(2014) (describing the debate and concluding no change to prior law).
60. Anderson, supra note 6, at 934–35. A limited prior user defense was created by the LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), § 5. See Manzo supra note
59, at 518–22.
61. Section 5 of the AIA creates a limited prior use defense. 125 Stat. at 297–99, amending 35
U.S.C. § 273 (2012). Section 15 of the AIA makes essentially unenforceable the requirement to
disclose an invention’s best mode, leading to the possibility of patenting while keeping the best
mode as a trade secret. 125 Stat. at 328, amending 35 U.S.C. § 282; see Love & Seaman, supra note
21, at 8. Finally, the Act arguably changed the definition of “public use,” see supra note 59.
62. The incentives and structures of the patent law system have been explored in depth by many
scholars; that literature need not be recapped here. For a few examples, see, e.g., Burk & Lemley,
supra note 5 (describing industry-specific shaping of patent law); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the
Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004) (arguing that patent races are beneficial
by promoting early expiration of patent rights); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (describing the prospect theory of patents); Lemley,
supra note 23; Merges & Nelson, supra note 5.
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common law doctrines focused on misappropriation or contract. 63 Mark
Lemley has argued to the contrary that trade secrecy has significant
benefits when considered as a form of intellectual property. He argues
that trade secret law actually promotes disclosure because it lets
inventors invest less in physical barriers to disclosure by relying instead
on legal protections; trade secret law can allow trade-secret holders to
share information within the bounds of a confidential relationship. 64
More recently, Jonas Anderson has argued affirmatively that secrecy
should be favored in some circumstances, because it is cheaper to
administer and may provide greater ex ante incentives for innovation of
some types. 65 The background policy, however, tilts toward disclosure,
as evidenced in part by the very structure of the patent system.
2.

The Role of Disclosure

An important thread in this debate challenges the effectiveness of
disclosure in the patent system as the alternative to trade secrecy,
although the centrality of disclosure as a justification for the patent
system is itself debated. 66 Katherine Strandburg has argued that
disclosure that speeds follow-on innovation is the principal benefit of
63. Bone, supra note 30; Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014).
64. Lemley, supra note 6; see also Anderson, supra note 6, at 945–46; Sharon K. Sandeen,
Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the
Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 344 (2008). For other
justifications of trade secrecy, see Risch, supra note 6. For a collection of recent scholarship on
trade secrecy, see THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
65. Anderson, supra note 6.
66. For arguments for disclosure’s centrality, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in
Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1012 (2008) (“[M]any familiar provisions
of the patent statute may be viewed as incentives for codification of otherwise tacit
knowledge . . . .”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2009) (arguing
for disclosure’s “centrality in the patent system”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 (2010) (arguing that “[i]t is now time to transform the
patent into a readable teaching document.”). For arguments against the role of disclosure as a patent
system justification, see, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent
Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 403 (2010) (“[D]isclosure is both ineffective and potentially
poisonous to larger social goals.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123, 146 (2006) (finding “disclosure obligations inconsistent with the theoretical justifications
of patent law . . . .”); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745
(2012) (“Disclosure theory cannot . . . support the modern patent system.”). Ouellette, after a useful
summary of this literature, suggests that argument about rationales is to some extent beside the
point; we should take the existence of the patent system as a revealed preference for disclosure, and
ask how well patents incentivize disclosure. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful
Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546–47 (2012).
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patent disclosure, 67 though this is not its only benefit. 68 If patents do not,
in fact, promote effective disclosure of information, then a key reason to
prefer patents to trade secrecy drops away. Patents may inadequately
drive disclosure for several reasons, related both to the transmission of
information by the patentee and the receipt by other potential innovators.
On the transmission side, the disclosure requirements of patent law
are not particularly effective. A patent must contain a written description
sufficient to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice
the invention. 69 In reality, however, “most scientists and engineers find
patents to be repetitive and often incomprehensible.” 70 It is not
particularly challenging to draft a patent application that provides
enough information to obtain a patent but does not reveal how to
practice the invention commercially. 71 In addition, patent applications
are not published for eighteen months after filing (and sometimes not
even then), slowing the transfer of timely information to other
innovators. 72 And although the protection afforded by a patent can
potentially enable the sharing of information through other, more
effective means of disclosure, such as scientific publications, firms
wishing to keep their innovation secret will not engage in this optional
extra sharing. 73
The disclosure function of patents is also lessened by doctrinal
considerations that decrease the likelihood of receipt; that is, other
potential innovators finding, understanding, and using the information
67. Strandburg, supra note 45, at 111–13.
68. Edmund Kitch argued that patents serve a key notice function, informing the public that a
claim has been staked to a piece of intellectual property. Kitch, supra note 62, at 273–74. Notice
does not require that others be able to use the innovative information, just that they know what is off
limits.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”).
70. Anderson, supra note 6, at 943–44 (citing Fromer, supra note 66, at 560–62; Benjamin N.
Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
2007, 2025 (2005)).
71. Id. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 486 U.S. 800 (holding that the firm could keep its secret process
for mass-producing rifles and making interchangeable parts as required by the government contract,
despite acquiring patents related to nine separate parts of the rifles. The Federal Circuit held that
“[p]atents are not production documents, and nothing in the patent law requires that a patentee must
disclose data on how to mass-produce the invented product, in patents obtained on either individual
parts of the product or on the entire product.”).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012); Holbrook, supra note 66, at 133–34.
73. Anderson, supra note 6, at 944.
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contained with the patent document. Timothy Holbrook has noted that
receipt and use of information is undermined in at least three ways. 74
First, the limited experimental use exception to patent infringement
means that competitors cannot easily experiment with and improve upon
a patented innovation without infringing the patent. 75 Second, the
“moribund” reverse doctrine of equivalents fails to shield those who use
patent disclosures to develop conceptually new innovations that still
infringe the literal scope of patent claims. 76 Finally, those who do
examine prior patents for information and are later found to infringe run
the risk of being found to have infringed willfully, with possible treble
damages. 77 Other scholars have generally agreed that the disclosure
function of patents performs relatively poorly. 78
This debate about innovation incentives, while still ongoing, has
tended to focus on the bilateral choice between trade secrets and patent
law, and has, as a consequence, neglected the impact of another
significant area of law: regulation. The next Part addresses the
interaction of regulatory oversight, principally premarket entry
requirements, with the protection afforded by patent law and trade
secrecy.
II.

THE IMPACT OF REGULATION

The dynamics of innovation and social welfare change in significant
ways in the context of heavily regulated industries, especially where a
premarket approval regime exists. 79 Two aspects of regulated industries

74. Holbrook, supra note 66, at 133–34.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 940–46; Roin, supra note 70; Strandburg, supra note 45,
at 111–18. But see Ouellette, supra note 66 (finding that engineers in the field of nanotechnology
glean useful information from patent disclosures).
79. Although the world of heavily regulated industries is a varied one, this paper, especially the
next section, focuses on regulation in the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, specifically the
production of drugs and biologics. These industries are large, important, and paradigmatic examples
of active innovation policy. An extensive literature focuses on innovation in drugs and biologics.
For a brief sample, see, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical
Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461 (2009);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717
(2005); Eisenberg, supra note 4; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 43; Arti K. Rai, Fostering
Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Roin, supra note 5. Detailed application to other regulated
industries, including aerospace, pesticides, medical devices, military equipment contracting, and
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change the way patents and trade secrecy operate. First, regulated
industries typically feature large public benefits—that is, the
technologies involved are almost by definition important to public
welfare or health; otherwise the industry would not be regulated. Thus,
disclosure potentially has more significant public benefits. Second,
regulatory limits on technology, especially in premarket approval
contexts, may strengthen the exclusive effects of patents and trade
secrecy by requiring through regulation that the protected product be
closely matched, a matching made difficult or impossible by secrecy or
patent protection. This Part first briefly describes some forms of
regulatory control, then discusses these two innovation features of
heavily regulated industries.
A.

Regulatory Control

Regulators can exercise varying degrees of control over their
regulated industries, including access to the market, the imposition of
civil or criminal penalties, and informal control such as faster or slower
passage through regulatory processes. Each type of control can be
viewed as a regulator-imposed cost (exclusion from markets, penalties,
slow processing) for noncompliance, or, simply from a different
baseline, a benefit associated with compliance (access to markets,
freedom from penalties, quick processing).
In a premarket approval regime—such as exists for drugs and
biologics (collectively, “biopharmaceuticals”) or medical devices,
regulated by the FDA, or pesticides, regulated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)—the ability to sell a product is conditioned on
meeting the regulator’s requirements, whether set by statute, 80
regulation, 81 or less formal means. 82 Since market access is totally
controlled by the agency, it can exert predictably tight control over
aspects of the industry leading up to market entry. 83 Agencies can also

nuclear power may yield further insight—for the latter two, including the implications of more
direct government control and involvement—but are beyond the scope of this Article.
80. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 901) (regulating drugs); Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No.
73-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601) (regulating biologics).
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2014) (Application for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug); 21
C.F.R. §§ 600–80 (regulating Biologics License Applications).
82. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY ON BIOSIMILARS: Q & AS
REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BPCI ACT OF 2009: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2012).
83. For an introduction to the many ways the FDA regulates the drug industry both formally and
informally, see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
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exercise control through the ability to remove noncompliant products
from the market. 84 I describe this control as the power of “regulatory
definitions,” since regulators can define—whether formally or
informally—the contours a product must have to achieve regulatory
approval. In this setting, regulatory approval creates the benefit of
market access.
Market-access types of control are particularly powerful since costs of
regulatory noncompliance cannot be offset by increased profits or
market share of the nonsalable regulated product. Such control, of
course, does depend on the ability of the regulator to observe the
regulated behavior. However, regulatory noncompliance is easier to
observe in the case of premarket approval where voluminous
submissions are required to receive that approval in the first place. 85
Lighter control may also be exercised by regulators without keeping
products out of the market. For instance, a regulator may have the ability
to impose civil monetary penalties or criminal penalties for regulatory
noncompliance. 86 These penalties can increase the cost for noncompliant
products, but—at least theoretically—can be offset by the benefits of
noncompliant sales. This is particularly true in instances where the
likelihood of enforcement is low, for instance in the enforcement of
manufacturing standards by an agency with a limited inspection
workforce 87 or ambiguous statutory authority. 88 This type of control can
be exercised over the characteristics of products, the methods used to
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen,
Nudging the FDA, 10 AM. INT. 35 (2014).
84. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136k (2012) (permitting the EPA to stop the sales of, seize, and destroy
noncompliant pesticides or pest-control devices); 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (2012) (authorizing FDA
recall of biologics). Notwithstanding statutory authority, most recalls are voluntary, though they
occur under the powerful—if sometimes implicit—threat of potential agency action. See Lars Noah,
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 873 (1997); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008).
85. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. Part 314 (2014) (enumerating requirements for a New Drug Application).
86. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136l (2012) (establishing the Environmental Protection Agency’s
authority to pursue civil and criminal penalties for violations of pesticide regulations).
87. The FDA, for example, inspected 19% of domestic drug or device manufacturing facilities in
FY 2014, and only 10% of foreign facilities. U.S. FDA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON INSPECTIONS OF
FACILITIES IN FY 2014, 3, 7 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/
Legislation/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/UCM432287.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V
MN-6YSZ].
88. See, e.g., Michael Snow, Note, Seeing Through the Murky Vial: Does the FDA Have the
Authority to Stop Compounding Pharmacies from Pirate Manufacturing?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1609
(2013) (describing the ambiguity in the FDA’s authority to oversee compounding pharmacies and
the resulting quality gaps).
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produce those products, or other aspects such as the way products are
marketed and sold. 89
Finally, regulators can informally exercise control and confer benefits
by modulating the speed at which regulatory processes occur.
Bureaucratic “red tape” can be expensive to firms, and conversely, quick
approval process can be highly valuable.90 Familiarity with a process can
lead to quicker agency action, which in turn may be consequential to
firms adopting that process. This informal control, while difficult to
observe, can significantly impact firm choices. 91
B.

Social Costs and Benefits

Another important characteristic of regulated industries is something
of a truism: they are regulated for a reason. Regulated industries have
significant social costs and benefits, which provide the rationale for their
regulation above the free-market baseline. The social welfare
implications can come in a variety of different forms. For instance, the
FCC regulates products that emit wireless radiation to ensure that they
minimize interference; every wireless product must certify FCC
compliance. 92 Interference from noncompliant devices creates
significant costs for others using the spectrum. 93
Similarly, the biomedical industries, including biopharmaceuticals,
have major social cost implications. Most obviously, the state has a
strong interest in ensuring that drugs are safe and effective, especially
considering the difficulty in acquiring high-quality information on that
safety and effectiveness. 94 Health care costs make up 17.5% of the
89. See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug
Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545 (2014) (discussing FDA
regulation of pharmaceutical promotion).
90. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Lara R. Maggs, & Ameet Sarpatwari, Experience With the
Priority Review Voucher Program for Drug Development, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1687–88 (2015)
(finding that priority review vouchers that speed FDA approval have sold for tens to hundreds of
millions of dollars); Price, supra note 12, at 512–14 (discussing the consequences of regulatory
delays in approving manufacturing techniques).
91. Price, supra note 12, at 512–14.
92. 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2014) (setting requirements for radio frequency devices).
93. See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication,
82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 941–42 (2004).
94. Eisenberg, supra note 4; see Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation
Constitute Markets?, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION,
164, 175–81 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (discussing health care products as
credence goods); cf. Abigail Alliance For Better Access v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing FDA justification for requiring completion of clinical trials before
allowing access to experimental drugs).
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national economy, and 45% of those costs are borne by federal, state,
and local governments. 95 Accordingly, the cost of products and the
existence of competition matter in the scheme of regulation; this
importance is exemplified by the creation of the statutory managedcompetition schemes for small-molecule drugs and biologics. 96 Similar
national health implications arise from the resiliency of the drug supply
chain, 97 the quality of manufactured drugs, 98 and the ability (or lack
thereof) of firms to quickly manufacture new drugs, such as the recent
push to ramp up production of treatments for Ebola. 99
The social costs and benefits in regulated industries function not so
much to change the way that innovation incentives function as to
magnify their effects and to place other values in the balance. For
instance, in debates about the appropriate role of patents for
pharmaceuticals, their role in creating incentives for innovation is
frequently juxtaposed against questions of access both domestically and
internationally. 100 Were there not tremendous social implications of
health and access to lifesaving medication, the juxtaposition would lose
force. In other contexts, we expect that incentives to invent will result in
higher prices, lower access, and deadweight loss, but those changes are
all part of the patent bargain: trading exclusivity for innovation and
disclosure.
The regulated nature of an industry serves therefore to flag that other
important social values, such as public health, transparency, and equity,
may need to be placed on the scale in determining the appropriate level
95. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2014
HIGHLIGHTS 1–2, www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Rep
orts/ NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW73-R24L].
96. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (creating a generic system for small-molecule drugs); Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262) (creating a
biosimilar competition system for biologics).
97. See, e.g., Mandy L. Gatesman & Thomas J. Smith, The Shortage of Essential Chemotherapy
Drugs in the United States, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1653 (2011); S. L. Kweder & S. Dill, Drug
Shortages: The Cycle of Quantity and Quality, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 245
(2013); J Woodcock & M Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile
Injectable Drug Shortages, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 170 (2013)
98. Price, supra note 12, at 506–08.
99. Andrew Pollack, Fast Track on Drug for Ebola Has Faltered, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/business/fast-track-on-drug-for-ebola-has-faltered.html
[https://perma.cc/L2G3-5VC3].
100. See, e.g., Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines:
A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 27, 27 (2002); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS,
Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
211, 217 (2004).
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of innovation incentive and in tailoring that incentive regime. This
tailoring includes not only access and price, but also the disclosure of
information. Data resulting from clinical trials of drugs and devices, for
instance, is considered to have significant value for follow-on innovation
leading to socially valuable health goals.101 Accordingly, a movement to
encourage or require the disclosure of clinical trial data is gaining steam,
despite the arguably negative effects of that disclosure on ex ante
innovation incentives and the ability of companies to commercialize
their research expenditures fully. 102
In heavily regulated industries, we should expect that disclosure and
access will frequently be especially important; therefore, the cost of
exclusivity, especially when obtained through trade secrecy, will
typically be high.
C.

Regulatory Definitions and IP

Regulation does not only change the stakes; it also substantively
strengthens intellectual property protection. As described above,
regulators can and do condition benefits on matching regulatory
definitions—whether formal or informal—of a product. 103 Those
benefits can include access to the market 104 or exemption from strenuous
requirements, 105 at one extreme, to a practically easier approval pathway

101. See, e.g., Richard Lehman & Elizabeth Loder, Missing Clinical Trial Data, 344 BMJ 8158,
8158 (2012); Michelle M. Mello, et al., Preparing for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data,
369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651, 1651 (2013).
102. Id.
103. See supra section II.A.
104. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b) (2014) (stating that no Abbreviated New Drug Application
may be filed for a drug involving a previously new active ingredient (a “New Chemical Entity”)
within five years of the first drug’s approval, or four years if the patent on the new drug is
challenged).
105. Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of
Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 285 (2009) (describing
data exclusivity for biologics; under a data exclusivity regime, competitors are not barred from
market participation, but must undertake their own expensive clinical trials). It is debatable whether
exemption from strenuous regulatory requirements (for instance, undertaking costly clinical trials) is
actually a benefit or merely an absence of a cost. Generic firms do not, after all, have a right to
bypass the clinical trial/NDA process; the ANDA pathway gives them that possibility, but is the
inaccessibility of that pathway really a regulatory benefit to the originator firm, or just the status quo
before the ANDA pathway existed? This concern comes into play when asking, among other things,
whether regulatory data exclusivity should be considered a form of intellectual property. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 359–66 (describing regulatory exclusivity as a “pseudo-patent”). The
question is essentially a baseline problem, though one with potential theoretical implications. This
Article focuses on implications for incentives and takes no position on the baseline question.
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at the other. 106 When achieving that regulatory benefit requires matching
a product or process protected by an excludability mechanism, whether
patent- or trade-secret-based, the regulator increases the power of that
mechanism.
1.

Patents

Patents are especially strong when bolstered by regulatory
requirements. This effect helps explain the strength of patents in the
pharmaceutical industry, an industry where patents are especially
important for excluding competition. 107 The FDA defines a drug as a
particular dose of active pharmaceutical ingredients administered in a
particular way. 108 A firm wishing to receive approval to market that drug
must demonstrate to the FDA—through nonclinical investigations and a
set of expensive clinical trials—that the drug is safe and effective for the
intended use. The total process typically costs firms several hundred
million dollars at least. 109 But this second requirement runs squarely into
patent protection on the original drug. 110 Normally, competitors can try
to invent around patents to develop a competitive product, but the FDA
approval regime, and the mechanics of generic competitor approval,
makes inventing-around much less profitable; as a result, patents are
incredibly strong on pharmaceuticals. 111 Competitors seeking to invent
around a drug patent by making a slightly different drug must undertake
the very high costs of independent clinical trials and approval. More
broadly, regulation limits inventing-around when market entry is
106. Price, supra note 12, at 519–22 (describing increased ease of regulatory oversight when drug
characteristics match the already-approved processes, rather than requiring justification of new
processes).
107. Roin, supra note 5, at 511–13.
108. More precisely, the FDA defines “pharmaceutical equivalents” as drugs that “contain the
same active ingredient(s), are of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in
strength or concentration.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG AGENCY, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Development
ApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm [https://perma.cc/URK8-JBKW].
109. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech
Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 469, 475 (2007).
110. This intersection is explicit in the statute; under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); submitting an
Abbreviated New Drug Application to piggyback on the approved New Drug Application of an
innovator is an act of infringement of patents claiming that drug. The same logic applies for
biosimilar applications. Id.
111. Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: Reconciling
Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement, 66 SMU L.
REV. 59, 107 (2013) (noting how FDA bioequivalence requirements restrict the ways generic drugmakers can alter innovator drugs).

13 - Price.docx (Do Not Delete)

1790

12/20/2016 1:07 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1769

conditioned on product characteristics that can be protected by a patent,
even if that patent protection might otherwise be very weak. 112
In the context of patents, a built-in safety valve exists for regulationstrengthened exclusivity: patents have defined scopes and expire after
twenty years. 113 Practically speaking, given the delay in regulatory
implementation, this period of exclusivity will often be significantly
less. The average nominal period of patent protection for an approved
drug is only sixteen years rather than twenty, because the FDA approval
process takes years and drugs are typically patented early in the
development process. 114
In a somewhat parallel context, this effect anchors the policy
landscape of standard-essential patents. Such patents cover aspects of a
technology required to comply with an industry standard, such as the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ (IEEE) standards for
ethernet and wi-fi. 115 While standards facilitate technical interoperability
and promote cumulative innovation, patents that cover technology
needed to meet a standard become potent weapons for hold-up. 116
Essentially, the standard-setting organization functions as a private
regulator, defining the contours of a market-acceptable product.
Inventing around the patent would violate the standard; noncompliance
penalties—that is, losing the market benefits of standardization—
therefore strengthen patents covering necessary technology.

112. Id. at 61–62 (discussing the narrow space between FDA-mandated bioequivalence and
patent-required differences). The dynamics of FDA approval give substantial power even to very
weak patents. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, any patent covering a drug may be listed by the drug’s
sponsor in the Orange Book. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA
and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 207–11 (2015). Companies seeking FDA market approval for a
generic version must typically participate in patent litigation on all patents listed in the Orange Book
before the generic can be approved, and Hatch-Waxman imposes an automatic 30-month stay on
that litigation—delaying generic approval for 30 months. Id. at 208. This applies even to weak
patents listed in the Orange Book, and the FDA explicitly does not police Orange Book patents for
quality or even relevance. Id. at 211–28.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
114. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 43, at 330 (noting that drugs in their dataset were covered
by a mean of 2.7 patents with a mean nominal patent term of 15.9 years.); see also 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2012) (setting patent term extensions based on regulatory review time). This feature of reduced
nominal life has been noted as a positive benefit of patent races. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the
Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 (2004).
115. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136 (2013).
116. See generally Joseph Farrell, et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 603 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2002).
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Regulatory interactions with patents are powerful enough, and clear
enough, that deliberate policy choices can be and often are made to
address them. Accordingly, most standard-setting organizations require
that standard-essential patents be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms to blunt the power of potential patent hold-up. 117
In the drug context, Congress made deliberate choices to counteract
regulatory strengthening of patents within the Hatch-Waxman Act. 118
Generic drug manufacturers have been given an incentive to challenge
weak drug patents; their challenges in response reduce the period of
patent protection from a nominal sixteen years to an effective eleven to
thirteen years. 119 Generics are also statutorily shielded from
infringement liability for work they do to prepare FDA regulatory
submissions while the patent on the lead drug is still in force. 120 This lets
generic companies prepare for regulatory submissions before patent
expiration so that they can enter the market as soon as possible. They
can also obtain invalidity and infringement decisions before entering the
market, obviating the need to launch products at risk and lowering the
risk of compensatory damages. Congress essentially recognized that
patent protection is incredibly strong when bolstered by the FDA’s
approval requirements. Accordingly, the Act makes countervailing
policy choices to increase competition by shortening the effective life of
drug patents and hastening competition once those patents do expire.
2.

Trade Secrecy

The interaction between regulatory definitions and trade secrecy is
parallel but more severe and problematic. The role of regulatory
definitions strengthens trade secrecy just as it does for patents, if
somewhat less explicitly. When a regulator defines a product, complying
with that definition can bring benefits or avoid costs, as described above.
If product characteristics reflect trade secrets, the exclusivity conferred

117. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 1136–37.
118. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35
U.S.C. (2012)).
119. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 43, at 330 (finding an average effective lifespan of 12.2
years); Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity
Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAG. DECIS. ECON. 491, 491–502 (2007) (finding in a sample
ranging from 1995 to 2005 average effective lifespans of 15.1 years for drugs with annual sales
below $50 million and 12.7 years for drugs with annual sales greater than $500 million).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012); see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d
1057, 1072 (2011) (holding that safe harbor applies before but not after approval).
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by those trade secrets becomes correspondingly more important. For
instance, when a secret manufacturing process is used to make a product,
and unique product characteristics resulting from that manufacturing
process are incorporated into regulatory definitions, that secret process
carries the weight of regulatory compliance. Competitors seeking to
comply with regulators must try to duplicate the secret process, which
can range from practically impossible to merely very expensive. 121 This
pattern might seem somewhat abstract and rare, but it occurs in the
context of manufacturing biologics, as described in depth below. 122
Trade secrets, unlike patents, lack the escape valve of duration. Trade
secrets can continue indefinitely, which can extend regulatory
strengthening for an indefinite time in problematic ways. As described
below, biologics especially suffer from this problem. 123 One quasibiologic product, Premarin, used to treat postmenopausal symptoms, has
experienced a monopoly based on interactions between regulation and
secrecy interactions for over seventy years, with no end in sight. 124
In addition, the interaction between trade secrecy and regulation is
often more opaque. While regulators in heavily-regulated industries may
have access to trade secret data, competitors (by definition) do not, so
understanding what characteristics of the regulated product result from
trade-secret processes is challenging. Interactions between patents and
regulation are explicit and sometimes known, so policy choices can take
them into account. Interactions between trade secrecy and regulation, on
the other hand, often fly below the policy radar, although recent
scholarship has attempted to bring attention to them. 125
The two aspects of regulatory industries described in this section
interact at a practical level. Regulation can strengthen the effect of
exclusivity and make the exclusive right closer to a true monopoly.
And—significantly—in heavily regulated industries, this effect is likely
to be more important on a social welfare level because those industries
tend to have higher ancillary social costs and benefits. 126 Accordingly,

121. Price, supra note 12, at 534–36.
122. See infra section III.
123. See infra section III.B.
124. Price, supra note 12, at 534–36.
125. See generally Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1042–49.
126. David Levine has made a parallel point in the context of public infrastructure, arguing that it
is fundamentally problematic for private firms to have trade secrets in matters of public
infrastructure such as voting machines, breathalyzers, or educational standards. David S. Levine,
Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135,
164–70 (2007) (describing trade secrecy in publicly funded public infrastructure produced by
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these issues are not merely theoretical, but have major practical
implications. Although this Part has attempted to briefly describe these
concerns and interactions in a conceptual fashion with brief illustrations,
their operation in practice is, unsurprisingly, more complex. The next
Part describes two examples of the impact of regulation on secrecy as an
excludability incentive in the biopharmaceutical industry, and attempts
to explain how the implications are socially problematic.
III. BREAKDOWNS IN BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
The biopharmaceutical industry, including both traditional smallmolecule drugs and larger biologics, is frequently presented as a success
story of innovation policy. In particular, patents are largely credited as
an important piece of the incentive structure for developing drugs. 127
Bringing a new drug to market, the story goes, is tremendously
expensive, so exclusion and the possibility of monopoly pricing are
needed to drive firms to develop new drugs. 128 Patents play an important
role in this process, to the extent that unpatentable compounds are rarely
developed. 129 With biopharmaceuticals, patents and products are often
closely matched because a key patent will claim the drug itself.
The biopharmaceutical industry might then seem an odd example to
observe the interplay between secrecy and innovation since the
products—by regulatory and practical requirement—are fully disclosed,
and are also almost invariably patented. Where, then, does secrecy fit
into this picture? The answer, of course, is that the industry is not so
simple as in the classic story. The industry does not just identify a single
compound, patent that compound, and then sit back to watch monopoly
profits roll in. Industry dynamics are, unsurprisingly, much more
complex, and it is in these complexities, and the innovation underlying
them, that secrecy comes into play.
In at least two areas in the biopharmaceutical industry, secrecy plays
an important role, and in each of those areas secrecy can significantly
hamper socially beneficial innovation. First, the secretive, idiosyncratic,
and frequently stochastic way biologics are made hampers the
development of biosimilars, the biologic quasi-equivalent of generic
drugs. Second, the intersection between regulatory preferences for
private firms); David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 61, 75–77 (2011) (describing trade secrecy in privately funded public infrastructure).
127. See Roin, supra note 5, at 507–15.
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id. at 545.
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stability and secrecy results in largely stagnant manufacturing process
for small-molecule drugs, leading to major social welfare losses both
from inefficiency and from quality lapses.
These two examples each have both practical consequences and
deleterious effects on the development of fundamental knowledge about
how drugs work and how they can best be made. Overall, while the
central story of the biopharmaceutical industry may rightly be focused
on patents and their (admittedly contested) success in driving the
development of new drugs, these two important areas of the industry
demonstrate that peripheral secrecy can lead to major social harm. In
these situations, the policy preference for patents and disclosure over
trade secrecy is unavailing; firms rely on secrecy because it provides
better benefits for them, though the social cost of that choice is
significant.
A.

Blocking Biosimilars

Secrecy plays a major and problematic role in the production of
biologics. 130 In particular, biologic manufacturing demonstrates the
power of the interaction between secrecy and regulatory definitions.
Because biologics are so closely defined by their manufacturing process,
secrecy for those processes can block competition for the associated
products.
Biologics differ significantly from small-molecule drugs. Smallmolecule drugs, as the name implies, are relatively simple and can be
chemically synthesized; these are compounds like statins, aspirin, and
codeine. Biologics, on the other hand, are large biological
macromolecules made by living cells; 131 these include mega-blockbuster
drugs like Humira ($8.5 billion in 2012 sales) and Enbrel ($7.5 billion)

130. For a detailed description of this interaction, see generally Price & Rai, supra note 11.
131. The label “biologic” also includes products of living cells other than therapeutic proteins,
such as vaccines, blood products, and antivenoms. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act,
42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012). This section focuses on the production of therapeutic proteins, generally
recombinant proteins produced in host cells, as such proteins are the leading edge of biologic
development and the focus of both medical and innovation policy. Biologics can be regulated by the
FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) or its Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER), and can be governed by either the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA) for older drugs or by the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) for biologics developed after
its enactment in 1944. See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products,
UNITED STATES FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentA
pprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicA
pplications/ucm113522.htm [https://perma.cc/ERN9-PDXV].
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and made up five of the top ten bestselling drugs of 2012.132 The
manufacturing processes for biologics are substantially more complex,
and that complexity has pervasive effects on the market for and
competition among those drugs. 133
In contrast to the relatively straightforward processes by which small
drugs are made, biologics are made through a complex path involving
synthesis by living cells. 134 Critically for the purposes of regulation and
innovation, the final biologics are quite path-dependent; that is, the exact
contours of a biologic depend on exactly how that biologic is made.135
Differences in production can change the final product, altering its
effectiveness and its safety. 136 In one instance, producing a biologic in a
different type of cell led to severe reactions to the new biologic.137 Even
changes in the container used to hold and administer the biologic can
change the stability, activity, and immune response of the biologic. 138
Other changes, of course, have little effect, but which changes matter is
largely unknown.
Accordingly, the FDA regulates the production of biologics quite
strictly. Any manufacturing changes by the company must be
accompanied by extensive evidence—based both in the company’s
experience and potentially in new scientific or clinical trials—that the
new biologic is the same as the old.139 More importantly, the complex
nature and path dependence of biologics significantly complicates the
process of developing competitors to biologics.
132. Craig W. Lindsley, The Top Prescription Drugs of 2012 Globally: Biologics Dominate, but
Small Molecule CNS Drugs Hold on to Top Spots, 4 AM. CHEM. SOC’Y CHEM. NEUROSCIENCE 905,
905 (2013).
133. Cost and innovation are also concerns in biologics manufacturing; manufacturing costs
comprise about 14% of total sales for biologics manufacturers, and concerns raised above about
stagnation remain significant. Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in
Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30, 33 fig.1 (2008). However, the
biosimilarity dynamic described below applies only to biologics, not small-molecule drugs, and is
therefore the focus of this section.
134. Paul J. Declerk, Biologicals and Biosimilars: A Review of the Science and its Implications, 1
GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 13, 13 (2012).
135. See Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1033–35.
136. Id. at 1035–36.
137. Sabine Louët, Lessons from Eprex for Biogeneric Firms, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 956
(2003).
138. Basant Sharma, Immunogenicity of Therapeutic Proteins. Part 2: Impact of Container
Closures, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 318, 319–23 (2007).
139. See Guidance: Demonstration of Comparability of Human Biological Products, Including
Therapeutic Biotechnology-derived Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 1996),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm122879.htm
[https://perma.cc/88QV-ZPQF]; Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1036.
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For small-molecule drugs, once the original drug loses patent
protection, generic versions of the drug typically enter the market
rapidly. 140 These generics are chemically identical to the original—an
identity easy to analytically verify—and are demonstrated to be
bioequivalent; that is, they have the same effect on the body. 141 Generics
are permitted to rely on the approval of the original drug, rather than
being required to undergo their own independent, lengthy, and costly
clinical trials.142
For biologics, on the other hand, currently available analytical
techniques are insufficient to demonstrate that a competitor product is
the same as the original biologic. 143 Instead, a follow-on firm must
demonstrate that the new product is “highly similar” to the original
biologic, without “clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of the
safety, purity, and potency of the product.” 144 To demonstrate this
similarity, the follow-on firm must undertake analytical and clinical
testing which can cost more than $100 million, rather than the few
millions typically required to demonstrate bioequivalence for a generic
small-molecule drug. 145
More challengingly, to create a similar biologic in the first place, the
follow-on company must reverse-engineer the complex manufacturing
process idiosyncratically developed by the first company. 146 This
reversal is precisely the kind of costly duplicative research that
innovation policy tries to avoid by encouraging inventors to move into
the patent system. The initial development of a biologic involves many
choices that have random factors, idiosyncrasies, and stochastic choices
that nonetheless influence the identity and characteristics of the final
product. 147 These choices are not typically deliberate, and frequently do
not improve the resulting biologic.

140. See generally Tracy L. Regan, Generic Entry, Price Competition, and Market Segmentation
in the Prescription Drug Market, 26 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 930, 938–39 (2008).
141. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 320.21–.63 (2014) (describing the procedures for determining the
bioavilability or bioequivalence of drug products); id. § 320.1(e) (defining bioequivalence).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
143. Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1036–37.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (2012). A biosimilar may also be determined to be interchangeable—
with the possibility of automatic pharmacy substitution—if it can be shown (1) to have the same
clinical effect for each individual patient and (2) to pose no additional safety or efficacy risk when
switching back and forth with the reference biologic over multiple uses. Id. § 262(i)(3).
145. Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1048.
146. Id. at 1046–49.
147. Some choices may be deliberate and have partially known consequences; for instance,
choosing to make a biologic in yeast rather than in mouse cells has predictable consequences for
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However, when a follow-on company wishes to market a biosimilar,
those twists and turns of manufacturing must largely be duplicated.
Current analytical science lacks the tools to characterize a biologic fully,
and also to understand how each measurable characteristic is important
to the final product. 148 Therefore, a follow-on firm must try its best to
match the manufacturing method of the first firm. 149 This effort may be
effectively impossible—in which case no biosimilars may ever enter the
market—or it may merely be very expensive and time-consuming. This
means that innovator companies receive not only the time-limited
protection of patents on the biologics themselves, they also are sheltered
from competition indefinitely by the secrecy surrounding their
manufacturing methods. 150 FDA regulation strengthens and calcifies this
pattern by requiring precise matching to the original biologic as much as
possible, even if some differences might not actually impact the drug’s
function. 151
One particularly strong example of this pattern is the case of the drug
Premarin, a product of natural conjugated estrogens made from the urine
of pregnant mares. 152 The FDA explicitly defines Premarin according to

how the biologic will be grown and must be purified. Other variations are random; for instance, the
precise way that recombinant protein DNA incorporates into the host cell is largely uncontrollable
and has variable consequences. See id. at 1033–35.
148. Id. at 1036–37.
149. Analogies may be made to the innovator firm’s demonstrations of comparability after
manufacturing changes, but those demonstrations are made with the benefit of extensive experience
and the trade-secret data about manufacturing processes. Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1036–37.
150. This juxtaposition raises the question: do these patents fail to satisfy the enablement
standard? Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012), a patent must enable a person having ordinary skill in the
art to practice the invention; if a second firm cannot make the biologic based on that patent, is the
patent valid? See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements
and Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
109, 133–37 (2011). The key distinction is that a patent may well enable such a person to create a
biologic as described in the patent—that is, a protein having a certain amino acid sequence—
without allowing that person to make the biologic as defined by the FDA—that is, a protein solution
with a very specific set of measurable characteristics, made in a particular way. See Price & Rai,
supra note 11.
151. For a description of this pattern in small-molecule drugs, see Janet Freilich, supra note 111,
at 70.
152. Wyeth v. Natural Biologics, Inc., No. Civ. 98-2469, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1 (D. Minn.
Oct. 2, 2003), aff’d, 395 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2005) (involving a trade secret misappropriation case
brought by the manufacturer of Premarin against a competitor). Although Premarin, as a natural
product, would be regulated as a biologic today, it was approved as a drug before the Public Health
Service Act was passed. Accordingly, substitute versions of Premarin would be approved as generic
drugs under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(j) (2012), not biosimilars under
the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012). For a more detailed account of the
Premarin trade secrecy case, see Price, supra note 12, at 534–36.
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its production process, and has not approved any synthetic estrogens as
generic substitutes for Premarin because the roles of the various
estrogens involved are not fully understood. 153 The production process is
kept as a trade secret, despite the existence of early patents on methods
of estrogen extraction. 154 Though many competitors have tried to
duplicate Premarin, they have all failed. 155 Accordingly, Premarin has
been a monopoly product for over seven decades, with—by definition—
no significant innovation in its production. 156
Secrecy in biologics manufacturing tremendously undermines a
deliberate policy of competition, with major consequences for the health
of patients and the economics of the health market. Biosimilar
development—when it occurs—is expected to cost up to $100–150
million, rather than the few million dollars required to develop a generic
small-molecule drug. 157 Consequently, biologics are expected to remain
much more expensive, with drops of only 20–30 percent in price once
competitive biosimilars enter the market. 158 And of course, as described
above, many biologics may face no biosimilar competition at all. 159
Secrecy in biologic manufacturing not only has profound economic
and health consequences, it prevents the generation of fundamental
knowledge that could increase our understanding of how biologics work
and how to make them safely and efficiently. 160 Innovator biologic firms
face scant incentives to develop fundamental knowledge about how
exactly biologics (theirs or in general) are produced; they benefit from
the indefinite protection provided by the combination of ignorance and

153. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Generic Premarin (May 5,
1997), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandPro
viders/DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfessionals/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm169045.htm
[https://perma.cc/3YMU-X8C5].
154. Price, supra note 12, at 534–35 (citing Wyeth, 2003 WL 22282371, at *1–2).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 535–36.
157. Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1048.
158. Id. at 1028–29.
159. One more drastic way to deal with the health consequences of absent biologic competition
might be to treat producers in important regulated industries as public utilities, and to more directly
regulate corporate behavior. See Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV.
57 (2015) (suggesting regulating the medical industry under public utility law). This Article
attempts to address the problem with less drastic measures, but should the problems persist, the
public utility model presents possibilities for further intervention—with, of course, attendant
political economy concerns.
160. This dynamic is cyclical; because the FDA requires tight matching to the original product,
incentives are lowered to understand the medical significance of manufacturing differences—which
in turn justifies the FDA’s continued requirement for tight matching.
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trade secrecy described above. Furthermore, innovator firms have
incentives not to develop or share detailed knowledge with the FDA, out
of fears that the FDA might require even more stringent matching to
earlier characterizations of their own drug. 161 While follow-on
companies have more significant incentives to develop analytical tools
and may have experience copying products, they lack the broad
experience with biologics’ development possessed by the innovator
firms. Overall, the incentives created by secrecy—or, more accurately,
by secrecy’s interactions with regulatory definitions and the market for
biologics—actively discourage the production of new, generalizable
knowledge and hamper the progress of cumulative innovation.
B.

Making Small Drugs

Trade secrecy and regulation also combine to create problems for the
manufacturing of small-molecule drugs. We often brush aside the fact
that drug manufacturers do, in fact, manufacture drugs. That is, in
addition to conducting the research that results in the discovery of new
drugs, and the clinical trials that demonstrate that those drugs are safe
and effective, firms must also produce the drugs for distribution to the
public. 162 Discussions of pharmaceutical innovation and economics,
however, typically focus on the cost of developing new drugs and not on
the challenges of actually making drugs. 163 This focus elides the real
problems with pharmaceutical manufacturing, which is non-innovative,
expensive, and of relatively poor quality. 164 These problems result from
the combination of regulatory hurdles to innovation and inadequate
intellectual property incentives. 165 A key piece of the latter is firms’
reliance on trade secrecy instead of patent protection, and the consequent

161. Price, supra note 12, at 535–36.
162. These functions may be split among multiple companies; not all drug companies discover,
develop, make, and sell their own drugs. Indeed, large firms may acquire small firms for the
discoveries those small firms have made, and may also license promising drugs as part of joint
ventures. Similarly, firms may outsource some parts of drug manufacturing to contract
manufacturing organizations (CMOs), rather than undertaking drug production themselves. See Ken
Garber, Biotech Industry Faces New Bottleneck, 19 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 184, 184–85 (2001).
This potential for splitting the process does not result in significant changes to the overall
innovation story; manufacturing still receives little scholarly attention, is still expensive and
problematic, and still shows little innovation. See Price, supra note 12; Price & Rai, supra note 11.
163. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005); Roin,
supra note 5; Bouchard, et al., supra note 79.
164. Price, supra note 12, at 497–509.
165. Id. at 509–39.
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loss of cumulative innovation from information transfer across firms. 166
The dominance of trade secrecy, alongside a regulatory structure that
creates incentives to avoid change, results in stagnation rather than
innovation. This section briefly describes the problems of drug
manufacturing, then discusses the problems in manufacturing innovation
and the role of secrecy in limiting that innovation. This section argues
that regulation and trade secrecy interact more simply and additively
than the complex biologic interaction described above, 167 but also with
large social costs.
Manufacturing is a high cost for drug companies, but the techniques
they use are surprisingly non-innovative, frequently relying on plants
and processes dating from the middle of the twentieth century. 168 The
modernization of manufacturing in other industries has passed the drug
industry by, with substantial consequences. 169 Moderate efficiency gains
could lead to annual social welfare surpluses of between $47 billion (if
savings were used to reduce drug prices) and $574 billion (if used to
increase research-and-development budgets). 170 On a more human level,
more innovative manufacturing and the accompanying closer control
over production could cut down on the drug quality problems, including
contaminations and shortages that have plagued the drug market. 171
The lack of innovation in the manufacturing side of the drug industry
results from two interacting factors. The first is regulatory. Like new
drugs themselves, manufacturing techniques must be preapproved by the
FDA; presenting an innovative technique as part of a New Drug
Application is a chance for uncertainty and delay in an industry that
fervently avoids both. 172 Making changes to approved techniques also
faces procedural and substantive hurdles, creating a manufacturing
mindset that a “product is approved and validated—do not change.” 173

166. Id. at 532–39.
167. See supra section III.A.
168. Price, supra note 12, at 500–01.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 505–06.
171. Id. at 506–09.
172. Id. at 512–14. Firms have avoided presenting new techniques to the FDA to avoid the
possibility of delay in winning drug approval. See Testimony of Normal Winskill, Vice President
for Manufacturing at Pfizer, at the FDA Science Board Meeting, 140–43 (Nov. 16, 2001),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/transcripts/3799t1_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RJH-E7XX]
(describing Pfizer’s decision to avoid using a new, faster analytical technique in a New Drug
Application to avoid the possibility of delays in FDA review).
173. THOMAS FRIEDLI, ET AL., OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
25 (2006) (stating that “[t]oo often in the past regulatory submission contained limited information
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Overall, FDA regulatory oversight creates incentives against innovation
in drug manufacturing.
The other key factor limiting this type of innovation is the
pervasive—and related—choice of drug manufacturers to rely on trade
secrecy instead of methods patents, which protect the methods of
manufacturing a product. 174 Drug makers choose trade secrecy over
patents for the eminently rational reasons described above. 175 Perhaps
most importantly, if the FDA regulatory regime encourages techniques
to stay constant over time, trade secrecy’s indefinite duration is
particularly attractive. Disclosure could potentially help competitors, and
serves no particular immediate benefit for the firm. More potently, the
scope of the protection can be quite narrow, needing to protect only a
specific set of manufacturing processes. Broader patent rights would be
challenging to enforce—as, in fact, are patent rights on the narrow
process, because manufacturing processes typically occur in secret.176
Discovering infringement in the first place is challenging, and once
infringement is known, the costs of litigation are high. 177 This
understandable choice of secrecy over patents and their attendant
disclosure obligations decreases the opportunity for industry-wide
cumulative innovation. 178
Unfortunately, pharmaceutical manufacturing is an area where
disclosure is highly desirable from a social standpoint, and potentially
from the standpoint of industry as well. Lack of available information
about manufacturing techniques severely dampens cumulative
innovation. 179 Furthermore, intense secrecy reduces the incentives for
some innovations; innovations with cost savings that are small but
scalable may be cost-ineffective for a single firm to develop, but
worthwhile across several firms. However, secrecy makes bargaining
harder than disclosure, whether through patents or otherwise. 180 Thus, it
concerning the specific root causes of those conditions. As a result, these conditions became
regulatory commitments and plant operators were expected to always reproduce exactly those same
sets of conditions. This type of operation can be considered a ‘static manufacturing operation’”).
174. Price, supra note 12, at 53239.
175. See supra section I.D.
176. See Price, supra note 12, at 526–27 (describing challenges in enforcing drug manufacturing
patents); id. at 553–54 (describing the potential use of regulatory disclosure and FDA mediation to
make patents easier to enforce and consequently more valuable).
177. See supra section I.C.
178. Price, supra note 1213, at 538.
179. Id. at 538–39.
180. Trade secrecy does help to solve Arrow’s Information Paradox. Lemley, supra note 6, at
336–37. That Paradox posits that licensing information is limited when the information must be
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is at least possible that the overall benefits to industry itself, setting aside
the public benefits, exceed the costs of greater transparency. But
industry’s ability to realize these gains may be limited by distributional
and collective-action problems. 181 The industry therefore remains in a
stable but socially undesirable state, where firms across the board
collectively rely on secrecy to protect the status quo, but where
continuing stagnation results rather than productive innovation.
IV. REGULATORY DISCLOSURE
Regulation can have pernicious interactions with secrecy-based
exclusivity, as described in the previous two Parts. However, the
presence of a regulator also creates new possibilities for resolving those
problems. Disclosure through the regulatory system is likely better to
serve the goal of effective disclosure and provides other ancillary
benefits, which could inure to the public, competitors in industry, and
potentially even the first innovators themselves—though effects on first
innovators are complex mixture of decreased secrecy protection coupled
with other potential benefits.182 For the reasons described above,
disclosure in the patent system is frequently ineffective. 183 Regulatory
disclosure resolves those issues. Essentially, where information is
submitted to a regulator to obtain regulatory benefits, including market
access or other regulatory competitive shelters,184 that information could
be disclosed publicly.
Such disclosure would obviously aid the goal of disclosure itself, but
would also help solve the problematic combination of secrecy and
regulatory boundaries by limiting trade secrecy in heavily regulated
contexts. This Part first describes the basic policy proposal of regulatory
disclosure. Second, it considers some of the implications of mandatory
disclosure, including enablement of cumulative innovation, the
disclosed to make the transaction attractive to the potential buyer. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 615 (1962). Trade secrecy helps protect the information from appropriation by the potential
buyer even after disclosure. Lemley, supra note 6, at 336–37. However, because trade secrecy only
protects information in the context of an existing confidence, it limits wider advertisement of
secrets.
181. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. The precise nature of the political economy
concerns of industry with respect to voluntary or mandatory disclosure are worth further study but
are outside the scope of this work.
182. See infra section IV.B.
183. See supra section I.D.2.
184. See generally Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 299 (2015).
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enhancement of oversight, increased worker mobility, and shifts toward
patents and explicable knowledge. Third and finally, it addresses some
political economy considerations and possible routes to implementation.
A.

Basic Framework

Government regulators overseeing a heavily regulated industry are
uniquely capable of operating and enforcing a meaningful disclosure
regime. When the regulated firm seeks some benefit from the
regulator—especially premarket approval, but also the maintenance of
market presence or some other benefit 185—the firm must convince the
regulator that it deserves the benefit. In the context of small-molecule
drug manufacturing, a pharmaceutical manufacturer seeking market
approval must demonstrate to the FDA’s satisfaction that its
manufacturing process is replicable, high quality, and controlled. 186
Similarly, in the biologics context, the manufacturer must show the FDA
that its process reliably produces a pure and therapeutically effective
biologic; to the extent that the process defines the product, the firm must
fully lay out its process to assist the FDA to understand the product
seeking approval. In each case, such information is contained within the
Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls section of the application for
premarket approval, whether a New Drugs Application or a Biologics
License Application.
The key aspect of these disclosures is that their purpose aligns closely
with the structure of the regulatory regime. Firms have strong incentives
to describe the details of their processes accurately; failing to convince
the regulator forfeits either some regulatory benefits or, more typically,
access to the market altogether. Penalties for nondisclosure or inaccurate
disclosure can be severe, both for the product at hand and, since many
firms are repeat players, for future firm interactions with the regulating
agency. 187
In addition to incentives for candid disclosure, regulators possess
subject-matter expertise in evaluating that disclosure. Patent examiners
have some scientific expertise in the area they examine, but are unlikely
to possess the same depth of experience as agency reviewers charged

185. See supra section II.A.
186. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1) (2014) (listing contents
of the Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls section). Any subsequent manufacturing changes
must be preapproved, concurrently approved, or reported, according to the significance of the
change. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2012).
187. See CARPENTER, supra note 83, at 673–84.
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with substantive evaluation to ensure social welfare benefits from the
regulated product. Put another way, while patent examiners need to
check that a patent application tells a practitioner in the field enough to
practice the invention, an FDA reviewer must ensure that the disclosed
process would actually work, and needs to have both full disclosure and
specific relevant expertise to make that determination.188
Accordingly, in heavily regulated industries, where the interaction
between secrecy and regulation is problematic, the regulator could
disclose those submissions required to achieve regulatory benefits. In the
FDA context, for instance, the Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls
section of a New Drug Application or Biologics License Application
could be published when the Application is approved. This would
provide clear disclosure to others—competitors or not—tied to the
regulatory benefit sought from the regulator. 189
B.

Implications

Regulatory disclosure has significant implications. Most obviously,
first innovators will lose the powerful combination of trade secrecy with
regulatory definitions as described above. This is the point of regulatory
disclosure, but will certainly encourage substantial pushback. Industry
innovators will argue that these incentives are necessary to drive them to
innovate, and that removing this powerful protection will reduce

188. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5) (requiring demonstration of safety and
efficacy and listing the documentation in a New Drug Application necessary to satisfy that
requirement). In contrast to FDA requirements, patent law does not strongly require that a patented
invention actually function well; while an invention must demonstrate operable utility (that is, it
must “work”), the burden is on the PTO to show that a person having ordinary skill in the art would
reasonably doubt that the invention would function. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir.
2000); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). An invention can pass the operable utility
bar even if it functions with low quality or efficiency; there is no commercial workability
requirement. See Ex parte McKay, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975) (rejecting
“practical considerations” as “the standard by which the statutory requirement of utility is to be
measured”).
189. The details of such a plan would need substantial further elaboration, but a first step might
look, perhaps counterintuitively, to patent law. Patent law’s enablement standard requires that an
applicant provide sufficient information that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be able to make the
product, as described in the patent, without undue experimentation. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988); see supra note 150 (describing why patent law’s enablement requirement does not
already solve the problem of inadequate disclosure in their circumstances). Regulatory disclosure
might be held to a similar standard; the sponsor must provide sufficient information that an
ordinarily resourced follow-on sponsor be able to match the regulatory definition of the product
without undue experimentation. For some products, such as small-molecule drugs, this would
require no more than what is disclosed now. For others, such as complex biologics, it would require
more extensive disclosure, perhaps even deposition of unique cell lines.
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innovation. A procedural response is that if these incentives are truly
necessary, then they should be part of the explicit policy conversation—
that is, the visible patent or regulatory exclusivity systems—rather than
buried in opaque interactions. A more substantive response is that any
cost to innovator companies should also be weighed against four
possible positive effects that impact initial and later innovators as well as
society more broadly. First, and certainly most important from an
innovation policy/intellectual property standpoint, increased effective
disclosure facilitates cumulative innovation both within firms and across
them. Second, disclosure promotes oversight through the mechanism of
transparency. Third, disclosure, by decreasing the importance of secrecy
and associated non-disclosure and non-compete agreements, may help
promote labor mobility. Fourth and finally, disclosure increases the
benefits of patents, both by removing the option of trade secrecy and by
increasing the ease of enforcement.
1.

Cumulative Innovation

The central benefit from mandatory disclosure would be the
furtherance of cumulative innovation. Though scholars argue about the
importance of disclosure as a rationale for the patent system itself, 190
disclosure is undoubtedly a key component of cumulative innovation;
without knowing the previous innovation, adding onto that innovation is
impossible. 191 Thus, we should expect that a functional disclosure
regime would increase later innovation.
Public disclosure should primarily facilitate inter-firm transfer of
information, which is the standard model of cumulative innovation. 192
However, removing the possibility of secrecy should also aid intra-firm
cumulative innovation. Measures taken to protect secret information can
hinder cumulative innovation even within a firm: taking reasonable
precautions to keep information secret can include compartmentalizing
information and limiting its transfer between departments. 193 Mandatory
disclosure to the outside world removes any need to compartmentalize
information within the firm. Because both types of follow-on innovation

190. See supra note 66, and sources cited therein.
191. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 29, 39 (1991).
192. Id.
193. See John Avellanet, Securing Intellectual Property from the Inside Out, in BEST PRACT.
BIOTECHNOLOGY BUS. DEV. 37 (2008).
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take place in contexts with high social costs and benefits, that innovation
is likely to be especially socially valuable. 194
2.

Oversight

In addition, meaningful public disclosure would increase possibilities
for oversight and transparency. Because social welfare impacts are high
in regulated industries, oversight is particularly important, both by the
regulator—hence its existence in the first place—and potentially by
other actors. Transparency and disclosure enable oversight. Regulators
can consult experts about potentially problematic methods, academics
can independently examine data, and competitors can apply their own
expertise to spot potential problems. In all of these instances, different
actors, with different incentives, can perform some aspect of an
oversight role.
In addition, the oversight burdens applied to typically overworked
administrative agencies can be more widely spread. Current agency
oversight is at times woefully under-resourced. FDA inspections of drug
manufacturing facilities, for instance, occur only once every several
years on average, though the FDA is working to increase that
frequency. 195 Allowing other parties to perform at least some
oversight—though, ideally, duplicative and complementary roles, not
substitutions—could help improve oversight in general.
3.

Worker Mobility

A third key implication from regulatory disclosure comes indirectly
through its effect in decreasing trade secrecy. As Orly Lobel and others
have noted, trade secrecy, and its frequent tying to non-compete
agreements, reduces labor mobility and may reduce overall
innovation. 196 These fears are bolstered by the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, which limits inter-firm transfer of workers whose new job
will inevitably require that they use the trade secret knowledge acquired
at their old job. 197 To the extent that regulatory disclosure decreases the
194. See supra section II.B.
195. See Price, supra note 12.
196. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory
of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013); Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind:
Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
376 (2009).
197. See Suellen Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent
Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become
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possibility of trade secrecy in those industries, the incentive for firms to
implement non-compete agreements is decreased. This at least has the
potential to increase worker mobility and further innovation. 198
4.

Increased Patenting

Mandatory disclosure does not mean that industry will cease to rely
on excludability mechanisms altogether. Indeed, absent some policy
choice otherwise, firms would still be able to rely on patent protection
for their inventions, just not on trade secrecy. Innovations that were
eligible for only trade secrecy before would be impossible to protect
(save through regulatory mechanisms discussed above). However,
innovations that were eligible for both patent protection and trade-secret
protection would only be patentable. Accordingly, industry would be
expected to patent some number of inventions that would otherwise be
kept secret with the consequences expected and laid out in other
scholarship for the choice of patents over trade secrecy.
Patents would be not only more valuable than no-longer-available
trade secrecy, but also would be more valuable than in the current
regime of patents without required disclosure. As described above,
method patents are particularly hard to enforce in part because methods
are kept secret, so infringement frequently goes unobserved. 199 If firms
effectively disclose their methods, observing patent infringement
becomes easier, which increases incentives to pursue patents in the first
place. 200
To the extent that firms can predict ex ante which types of
innovations are likely to be patentable and which would be only
protected by no-longer-available trade secrecy, they should be expected
to allocate more resources to patent-eligible innovation. Because of
patent law’s requirements that the innovation be describable and, ideally,
explicable, this may help develop fundamental knowledge, which will
then be shared through both the imperfect patent disclosure and more
effective regulatory disclosure.

Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167
(2005); Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable
Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002).
198. See generally LOBEL, supra note 196.
199. See Price, supra note 12, at 526–27; Jeffrey I. D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the
Egg: Pre-Suit Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 7 (2002).
200. Price, supra note 12, at 554–55.
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Implementation

Regulatory disclosure of trade secrets comes with substantial
interrelated concerns about implementation mechanisms, takings
doctrine, and political economy. Regulatory disclosure is meant to be a
real potential solution to real problems; that means that the practicalities
of its implementation must be actively considered. This section briefly
addresses some of those practicalities, although implementation would
require substantially more study.
Should regulatory disclosure be mandatory or voluntary? A
mandatory approach would solidify the benefits described above and
ensure an equal playing field across the industry. However, mandatory
disclosure might be harder to implement. In addition to political
economy concerns, discussed below, a mandatory regime would raise
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause concerns, particularly if applied
retroactively. 201 Trade secrets have been recognized as property under
state law, and are generally protected from agency disclosure under
federal law. 202 Simply disclosing currently secret manufacturing
methods, for instance, would then run afoul of current federal
prohibitions and would likely constitute a taking requiring
compensation—which could be quite substantial for trade secrets
protecting exclusivity for a product. Prospective requirements that
disclosure of trade secrets accompany an application for regulatory
benefit, on the other hand, could avoid the takings problem but would
leave untouched a large swath of currently indefinite trade secrets. 203
One intriguing possibility for resolving this dilemma would be to tie
disclosure to regulatory misfeasance or malfeasance. When firms run
afoul of related regulations—for instance, failing to maintain quality

201. A full analysis of the Takings Clause concerns is outside the scope of this work.
202. Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1054–55. Under 21 U.S.C. § 301(j), the FDA is specifically
prohibited from revealing trade secret manufacturing information under current law.
203. Even prospective disclosure requirements, if tied to the FDA’s market approval regime,
might constitute an unconstitutional condition. Under Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), property given up in exchange
for government permission must be closely related and roughly proportional to the relevant social
cost. However, the Supreme Court also noted in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto in the related area of
regulated pesticides, that:
[A]s long as [a firm] is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the
conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of
data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be
called a taking.
467 U.S. 985, 1007 (1984). See also Price & Rai, supra note 11, at 1054–55 (discussing the Takings
Clause concerns with mandatory disclosure in the biosimilars context).
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standards in manufacturing or to prevent manufacturing-based
shortages—the regulator could impose a disclosure requirement as part
of the solution or penalty. 204 This tactic has been used extensively by the
Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services in the context of False Claims Act 205 actions against health care
providers, pharmaceutical companies, and medical device
manufacturers, 206 where firms agree to ongoing corporate obligations to
avoid the corporate “death sentence” 207 of exclusion from Medicare,
Medicaid, and other federal health care programs. 208 Senator Elizabeth
Warren has proposed a similar path for pharmaceutical firms, where
settlements would require contributing revenues to NIH research209
rather than disclosing information they already possess. This could also
potentially obviate takings concerns.
Voluntary efforts at regulator-facilitated disclosure also resolve
takings issues, but create the potential for gaming. Voluntary disclosure
could be driven by incentives provided to firms, most likely in the form

204. This does create the possibility that only some firms will disclose their innovations.
Problematically, these firms would be likely to have quality problems and therefore make
questionable models for cumulative innovation. There are at least three responses to this criticism.
First, a large fraction of firms may stochastically come under this type of problem-solving
jurisdiction at one point or another, so many firms would eventually disclose. Second, obligations
imposed on a large fraction of the industry may shift the industry equilibrium to a disclosure norm.
Third and finally, while having problematic firms disclose may not be ideal for cumulative
innovation, it does serve the other goals described above; oversight and transparency are
particularly important for underperforming firms, as is the possibility of redundant production in
situations where socially valuable goods are vulnerable to quality problems or supply interruptions.
See Janet Woodcock & Marta Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile
Injectable Drug Shortages, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 170 (2013)
(noting shortages of sterile injectable drugs due to quality problems at sole manufacturers).
205. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
206. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT DOCUMENTS (2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/comp
liance/corporate-integrity-agreements/cia-documents.asp [https://perma.cc/W7VN-VYLT] (listing
447 entities with Corporate Integrity Agreements, Certification of Compliance Agreements, and
Settlement Agreements. These include large healthcare companies, biopharmaceutical companies,
medical device manufacturers, hospitals, and individual practitioners).
207. Edward P. Lansdale, Used as Directed? How Prosecutors Are Expanding the False Claims
Act to Police Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 181 (2006).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2012).
209. See Elizabeth Warren, “Support the Medical Innovation Act” (2015), my.elizabeth
warren.com/page/s/nihbill [https://perma.cc/A6U2-9SPM]; Ed Silverman, Senator Wants Big Drug
Makers That Break the Law to Fund NIH, WSJ BLOGS – PHARMALOT (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/01/22/senator-wants-big-drug-makers-that-break-the-law-tofund-nih/ [https://perma.cc/YP7Q-3VSF].
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of regulatory benefits such as agency-enforced exclusivity. 210 That is, if
a firm discloses its secret methods, the agency could offer as a reward
exclusivity for that method (or, potentially, some other exclusivity such
as an extension of exclusivity for the product itself). Such exclusivity
would have a limited duration and be explicit, resolving some of the
problems with secrecy. 211 However, firms would be expected to game
the system; those secrets worth more than the exclusivity would be kept
secret, and those of lesser value would be disclosed, leading to a socially
suboptimal outcome.
The political economy of choosing mandatory versus voluntary
disclosure is more complicated than might be expected. On the one
hand, mandatory disclosure means that firms may—intentionally—lose
the strong protection that comes from combining exclusivity with
regulatory definitions; this would seem likely to prompt strong protest.
On the other hand, widespread secrecy is a strong barrier to cumulative
innovation and also decreases investment in innovations that require
widespread distribution to be economically feasible; secrecy can
accordingly result in an industry-wide equilibrium of stagnation that is to
no firm’s benefit but that requires collective action to solve. 212
Regulatory disclosure mandates could break this equilibrium and shift to
a higher-innovation equilibrium with increased quality and efficiency
resulting. This view accords with at least some opinions in industry, 213
although the political economy of this choice may be different for
different regulated industries.
Congress has already taken a step in the direction of mandated
disclosure. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, which
created the follow-on biologics pathway, includes provisions requiring a
follow-on biologic applicant to provide the innovator company with its
full application packet—disclosing the applicant’s trade secrets—for the
210. See generally Price, supra note 12; Price & Rai, supra note 11; Heled, supra note 184;
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 4.
211. See Price, supra note 12, at 512–32 (discussing the limits of regulatory exclusivity); id. at
534–36 (discussing the problem of trade secrecy’s potentially unlimited term).
212. One might ask why a collective action should persist in regulated industries with relatively
few industry players and low amounts of certainty about the success of any particular product. See.
Joseph A. DiMasi, et al., Clinical Approval Success Rates for Investigational Cancer Drugs, 94
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 329 (2013). However, the current maintenance of
secrecy across industries belies this possibility. Furthermore, even if the industry players could be
brought together, firms have incentives only to share information they have learned in the course of
developing their processes, not the processes themselves.
213. Industry executive statements, MIT Center for Biomedical Innovation Summit: The Impact
of Biosimilars and Biobetters on Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing (Nov. 15, 2012) (under the
Chatham House Rules of the meeting, statements cannot be individually attributed).
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purpose of enforcing the innovator’s patent rights. 214 Although the
disclosure is tightly circumscribed to avoid transfer of information
between inventors, the fact remains that the Act mandates disclosure of
trade secrets to the competitor most interested in those secrets. 215 While
the Act reflects special congressional attention to follow-on biologics—
and solicitude toward industry incumbents—it also demonstrates the
possibility of a more integrated innovation policy in regulated industries,
including a requirement of disclosure.
A final issue concerns international effects. If information currently
kept secret is disclosed, that disclosure is almost certainly a disclosure to
the world. 216 On the other hand, the offsetting benefits described here—
principally regulatory exclusivity—are wholly domestic benefits.
Accordingly, domestic firms may lose competitive advantages vis-à-vis
international competitors. This is a real problem that must be addressed
in the course of determining implementation details, but three
possibilities exist that may curtail the problem. First, domestic benefits
may be sufficient—or could be adjusted—to account for international
competition; for instance, the United States pharmaceutical market is by
far the world’s largest, 217 and regulatory benefits in that context may
outweigh the loss caused by disclosure of, for instance, manufacturing
methods. Crucially, regulatory control over market access means that
regulators can and do keep international competitors’ products from the
domestic market when enforcing regulatory exclusivity. Second,
regulatory coordination among the largest markets, such as the European
Union, the United States, and Japan, could maintain regulatory
protection in large fractions of the relevant market. 218 Finally, to the
extent that firms are able to patent innovations they would otherwise
have kept secret, international patent protection can take the place of
internationally effective secrecy.
The mechanics of implementing regulatory disclosure are
undoubtedly complex, and will require input from agency and industry
214. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012).
215. Id. §§ 262(l)(1)(B)–(D).
216. It is possible to imagine a more limited disclosure regime—for instance, the regulator could
hold the disclosed information and only disclose to domestic competitors under confidentiality
requirements—but such a limited regime would be difficult to enforce and would sacrifice many of
the benefits of broader disclosure.
217. See, e.g., EUROPEAN FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
IN FIGURES: KEY DATA 2012, at 4 (2012), http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Modules/Documents/efpia_
figures_2012_final-20120622-003-en-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UMZ-U9WQ].
218. Global regulatory coordination would completely solve the problem, but is almost certainly
an impossible problem of political economy.
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stakeholders, as well as academic study. Given the tremendous costs,
and corresponding potential gains, associated with secrecy and
innovation in regulated industries, the effort is eminently worthwhile.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property provides a key policy tool to drive innovation.
But in heavily regulated industries, regulation plays a critical role in
shaping how innovation proceeds. Regulation profoundly shapes the
way intellectual property works; it strengthens it, and can push firms to
choose secrecy over patents. That choice, however, creates problems by
sharply limiting disclosure in regulated industries.
Disclosure is useful; it enables follow-on innovation, as well as
enhancing transparency and oversight. The value of disclosure is
especially high in industries with significant public benefits, like the
heavily regulated biopharmaceutical industry, with its public health
implications. Although this Article has focused on that industry, the
insight that secrecy and strict regulation interact in socially problematic
ways can be applied more broadly, such as in pesticides, nuclear power,
or even military procurement. Each area demands careful and close
consideration, but in general, the regulatory regimes of heavily regulated
industries often can and—and perhaps should—be leveraged to drive
additional disclosure, and to increase the innovation that follows.

